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Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 502-511
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Limitations of randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
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Author keywords
combinatorial auctions; mechanism design; submodular functions
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Indexed keywords
ALGORITHMIC MECHANISM DESIGN;
APPROXIMATION RATIOS;
COMBINATORIAL AUCTION;
COMPUTATIONALLY EFFICIENT;
INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY;
INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE MECHANISMS;
MECHANISM DESIGN;
MODULAR FUNCTIONS;
ORACLE MODEL;
POLYNOMIAL TIME APPROXIMATION;
POLYNOMIAL-TIME;
PUBLIC PROJECT;
RANDOMIZED MECHANISM;
RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROBLEM;
SOCIAL WELFARE;
STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS;
SUBMODULAR FUNCTIONS;
THEORY AND PRACTICE;
TRUTHFUL MECHANISMS;
COMMERCE;
COMPUTER SCIENCE;
MACHINE DESIGN;
OPTIMIZATION;
POLYNOMIAL APPROXIMATION;
APPROXIMATION ALGORITHMS;
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EID: 84863311520
PISSN: 02725428
EISSN: None
Source Type: Conference Proceeding
DOI: 10.1109/FOCS.2011.64 Document Type: Conference Paper |
Times cited : (40)
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References (26)
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