Causing human actions: New perspectives on the causal theory of action

Causing Human Actions: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 1-327

  Aguilar, Jesús H ^a   Buckareff, Andrei A ^b  

^a ROCHESTER INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b MARIST COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84895164845     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Book

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