Motivation and Agency

Motivation and Agency

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 1-278

  Mele, Alfred R ^a  

^a FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Agency; Alfred mele; Causal theory of human agency; Moral theory; Motivation; Motivational explanation; Motivational strength; Philosophy; Philosophy of action; Philosophy of mind; Philosophy of psychology; Practical reasoning; Reasons; Self control

Indexed keywords

EID: 84921315955     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/019515617X.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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