On trying to save the simple view

Mind and Language

Volumn 21, Issue 5, 2006, Pages 565-586

  Nadelhoffer, Thomas ^a  

^a DICKINSON COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33750453802     PISSN: 02681064     EISSN: 14680017     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2006.00292.x     Document Type: Article

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