Competition, cooperation and collective choice

Economic Journal

Volumn 124, Issue 574, 2014, Pages

  Markussen, Thomas ^a   Reuben, Ernesto ^b   Tyran, Jean Robert ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN   (Denmark)

^b University of Columbia ^*  (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84894324830     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: 14680297     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12096     Document Type: Article

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