Everyone is a winner: Promoting cooperation through all-can-win intergroup competition

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 26, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 25-35

  Reuben, Ernesto ^a,b   Tyran, Jean Robert ^c  

^a The Sanford C Bernstein Co Center for Leadership and Ethics   (United States)

^b IZA   (Germany)

^c UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN   (Denmark)

Author keywords

Cooperation; Experiment; Intergroup competition; Public goods

Indexed keywords

EID: 72149095721     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2009.10.002     Document Type: Article

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