Revisiting strategic versus non-strategic cooperation

Experimental Economics

Volumn 15, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 24-43

  Reuben, Ernesto ^a   Suetens, Sigrid ^b  

^a Columbia University and IZA ^*  (United States)

^b TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Cooperation; Repeated games; Reputation building; Strong reciprocity

Indexed keywords

EID: 84856352669     PISSN: 13864157     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10683-011-9286-4     Document Type: Article

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