Internal competition for corporate resources and incentives in teams

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 35, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 710-727

  Marino, Anthony M ^a   Zábojník, Ján ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 17044420512     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/1593769     Document Type: Article

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