Relative performance compensation, contests, and dynamic incentives

Management Science

Volumn 55, Issue 8, 2009, Pages 1306-1320

  Casas Arce, Pablo ^a   Martínez Jerez, F Asís ^b  

^a IESE BUSINESS SCHOOL   (Spain)

^b HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United States)

Author keywords

Dynamic incentives; Multitasking; Relative performance compensation; Tournaments

Indexed keywords

EXPENSIVE PRODUCTS; INCENTIVE PROGRAMS; PERFORMANCE DIMENSIONS; PERFORMANCE EVALUATION; RELATIVE PERFORMANCE; RELATIVE PERFORMANCE COMPENSATION; TOURNAMENTS;

MULTITASKING;

SALES;

EID: 69049105590     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: 15265501     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1090.1021     Document Type: Article

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