Voter turnout as a participation game: An experimental investigation

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 25, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 385-406

  Schram, Arthur ^a   Sonnemans, Joep ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030304510     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF02425263     Document Type: Article

References (9)

1. Andreoni J (1988) Why free ride? Strategies and learning in public goods experiments. Journal of Public Economics 37: 291-304
2. Downs A (1957) An economic theory of democracy. Harper and Row, New York
3. Isaac RM, Walker JM (1988) Group size effects in public good provision: The voluntary contributions mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 53: 179-199
4. Isaac RM, Walker JM, Thomas SH (1984) Divergent evidence on free riding: An experimental examination of possible explanations. Public Choice 43: 113-149
5. Morton RB (1991) Groups in rational turnout models. American Journal of Political Science 35: 758-776
6. Palfrey TR, Rosenthal H (1983) A strategic calculus of voting. Public Choice 41: 7-53
7. Palfrey TR, Rosenthal H (1988) Private incentives in social dilemmas. The Effects of Incomplete Information and Altruism: Journal of Public Economics 35: 309-332
8. Schram AJHC, Sonnemans J (1996) Why people vote: experimental evidence. Forthcoming in the Journal of Economic Psychology.
9. Schram AJHC, van Winden FAAM (1991) Why people vote: Free riding and the production and consumption of social pressure: Journal of Economic Psychology 12: 575-620