Competition, cooperation, and corporate culture

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 42, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 23-43

  Kosfeld, Michael ^a   Von Siemens, Ferdinand A ^b  

^a GOETHE UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 79951546348     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: 17562171     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2010.00124.x     Document Type: Article

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