Enforcement of contribution norms in public good games with heterogeneous populations

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 77, Issue 1, 2013, Pages 122-137

  Reuben, Ernesto ^a,b   Riedl, Arno ^a,c,d,e  

^a IZA   (Germany)

^b Columbia University ^*  (United States)

^c CESIFO   (Germany)

^d NETSPAR   (Netherlands)

^e MAASTRICHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Cooperation; Heterogeneous groups; Norm enforcement; Public good; Punishment; Social norms

Indexed keywords

EID: 84867804123     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.10.001     Document Type: Article

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