The role of organizational scope and governance in strengthening private monitoring

Organization Science

Volumn 24, Issue 5, 2013, Pages 1558-1584

  Pierce, Lamar ^a   Toffel, Michael W ^b  

^a WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST LOUIS   (United States)

^b HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United States)

Author keywords

Auditing; Automobile; Corruption; Environmental; Ethics; Governance; Organizational structure; Outsourcing; Pollution; Regulation; Scope

Indexed keywords

EID: 84881438968     PISSN: 10477039     EISSN: 15265455     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/orsc.1120.0801     Document Type: Article

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