Political decentralization and corruption: Evidence from around the world

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 93, Issue 1-2, 2009, Pages 14-34

  Fan, C Simon ^a   Lin, Chen ^b   Treisman, Daniel ^c  

^a LINGNAN UNIVERSITY   (Hong Kong)

^b CITY UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG   (Hong Kong)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Corruption; Decentralization; Political economy

Indexed keywords

EID: 57749199314     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.09.001     Document Type: Article

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