Private operation with public supervision: Evidence of hybrid modes of governance in prisons

Public Choice

Volumn 145, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 281-293

  Cabral, Sandro ^a   Lazzarini, Sergio G ^b   de Azevedo, Paulo Furquim ^c  

^a FEDERAL UNIVERSITY OF BAHIA   (Brazil)

^b INSPER INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION AND RESEARCH   (Brazil)

^c FUNDAÇÃO GETÚLIO VARGAS   (Brazil)

Author keywords

Hybrid governance; Implicit contracts; Prisons; Public supervision

Indexed keywords

EID: 77955846421     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-009-9566-0     Document Type: Article

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