Hybrid organizational arrangements and their implications for firm growth and survival: A study of new franchisors

Academy of Management Journal

Volumn 39, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 216-234

  Shane, Scott A ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030306780     PISSN: 00014273     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/256637     Document Type: Article

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