Competition in bureaucracy and corruption

Journal of Development Economics

Volumn 92, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 107-114

  Drugov, Mikhail ^a  

^a NUFFIELD COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Bureaucracy; Competition; Corruption; Red tape

Indexed keywords

BUREAUCRACY; COMPETITION (ECONOMICS); CORRUPTION; INVESTMENT; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 77951620382     PISSN: 03043878     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2009.02.004     Document Type: Article

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