Model-theoretic knowledge accumulation: The case of agency theory and incentive alignment

Academy of Management Review

Volumn 38, Issue 3, 2013, Pages 442-454

  Harris, Jared D ^a   Johnson, Scott G ^b   Souder, David ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA   (United States)

^b OKLAHOMA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84879808335     PISSN: 03637425     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5465/amr.2011.0141     Document Type: Article

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