Constraints and incentives for making long horizon corporate investments

Strategic Management Journal

Volumn 31, Issue 12, 2010, Pages 1316-1336

  Souder, David ^a   Shaver, J Myles ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

Author keywords

corporate investments; executive compensation; firm survival; payoff horizon; risk

Indexed keywords

CABLE TELEVISION; CORPORATE INVESTMENTS; EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION; EXPECTED RETURN; FIRM SURVIVAL; LONG-TERM INVESTMENT; PAYOFF HORIZON; STOCK OPTIONS;

INDUSTRY; INVESTMENTS; SUBSCRIPTION TELEVISION; TELEVISION BROADCASTING;

ECONOMICS;

EID: 78249255187     PISSN: 01432095     EISSN: 10970266     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/smj.862     Document Type: Article

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