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Volumn 14, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 213-216

A theory of the firm only a microeconomist could love

Author keywords

Agency theory; Corporate governance; Principal agent model

Indexed keywords


EID: 20444479538     PISSN: 10564926     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1056492605275352     Document Type: Review
Times cited : (32)

References (4)
  • 2
    • 44649197264 scopus 로고
    • Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure
    • Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. F. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305-360.
    • (1976) Journal of Financial Economics , vol.3 , pp. 305-360
    • Jensen, M.C.1    Meckling, W.F.2
  • 3
    • 33846542389 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • An embeddedness framing of governance and opportunism: Towards a cross-nationally accommodating theory of agency
    • in press-a
    • Lubatkin, M., Lane, P., Collin, S., & Very, P. (in press-a). An embeddedness framing of governance and opportunism: Towards a cross-nationally accommodating theory of agency. Journal of Organization Behavior.
    • Journal of Organization Behavior
    • Lubatkin, M.1    Lane, P.2    Collin, S.3    Very, P.4
  • 4
    • 20444477773 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The origins of a nationally-bounded governance heritage: A historical institutional analysis of principal-agent relations in the U.S., Sweden and France
    • in press-b
    • Lubatkin, M., Lane, P., Collin, S., & Very, P. (in press-b). The origins of a nationally-bounded governance heritage: A historical institutional analysis of principal-agent relations in the U.S., Sweden and France. Organization Studies.
    • Organization Studies
    • Lubatkin, M.1    Lane, P.2    Collin, S.3    Very, P.4


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.