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Volumn , Issue , 2013, Pages 73-90

Optimal auctions via the multiplicative weight method

Author keywords

Auctions; Bayesian mechanism design

Indexed keywords

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; MACHINE DESIGN; RISK PERCEPTION;

EID: 84879739099     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/2492002.2482547     Document Type: Conference Paper
Times cited : (21)

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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.