Polyhedral clinching auctions and the adwords polytope

Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 107-121

  Goel, Gagan ^a   Mirrokni, Vahab ^a   Paes Leme, Renato ^b  

^a GOOGLE INC   (United States)

^b Cornell University ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

adauctions; algorithms; budgets; economics; mechanism design; theory

Indexed keywords

ADAUCTIONS; AUCTION THEORY; BANDWIDTH MARKET; BUDGET CONSTRAINT; BUDGETS; GEOMETRIC DESCRIPTION; IMPOSSIBILITY RESULTS; INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE; MARGINAL UTILITY; MECHANISM DESIGN; MULTI-UNIT AUCTION; NEW APPLICATIONS; ORACLE ACCESS; PARETO-OPTIMAL; POLYMATROIDS; POLYTOPES; SUBMODULAR FUNCTIONS; THEORY;

ALGORITHMS; BUDGET CONTROL; COMPUTATION THEORY; ECONOMICS; MACHINE DESIGN;

COMMERCE;

EID: 84862611044     PISSN: 07378017     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/2213977.2213990     Document Type: Conference Paper

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