Budget feasible mechanisms

Proceedings - Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 765-774

  Singer, Yaron ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

MACHINE DESIGN;

APPROXIMATION RATIOS; APPROXIMATION RESULTS; BUDGET CONSTRAINT; ECONOMIC SITUATION; GENERAL FUNCTIONS; PROCUREMENT AUCTION; SUBMODULAR FUNCTIONS; UTILITY FUNCTIONS;

BUDGET CONTROL;

EID: 78751557867     PISSN: 02725428     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/FOCS.2010.78     Document Type: Conference Paper

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