Incentive compatible budget elicitation in multi-unit auctions

Proceedings of the Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 554-572

  Bhattacharya, Sayan ^a   Conitzer, Vincent ^a   Munagala, Kamesh ^a   Xia, Lirong ^a  

^a Duke University   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMMERCE; PARETO PRINCIPLE;

APPROXIMATION RESULTS; INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE; INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE MECHANISMS; INFINITELY DIVISIBLE; MONOTONICITY PROPERTY; MULTI-UNIT AUCTION; REVENUE MAXIMIZATION; SINGLE PRICE AUCTION;

BUDGET CONTROL;

EID: 77951695443     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1137/1.9781611973075.47     Document Type: Conference Paper

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