Bayesian mechanism design for budget-constrained agents

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 253-262

  Chawla, Shuchi ^a   Malec, David L ^a   Malekian, Azarakhsh ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON   (United States)

^b NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Bayesian mechanism design; budgets; revenue; welfare

Indexed keywords

BAYESIAN MECHANISM DESIGNS; BUDGETS; CONSTANT FACTOR APPROXIMATION; MECHANISM DESIGN; REVENUE; SOCIAL WELFARE; UTILITY FUNCTIONS; WELFARE;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE; INTELLIGENT AGENTS; MACHINE DESIGN;

BUDGET CONTROL;

EID: 79959591180     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1993574.1993613     Document Type: Conference Paper

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