Auction design with a risk averse seller

Economics Letters

Volumn 65, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 71-74

  Esö, Péter ^a   Futó, Gábor ^b  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b EÖTVÖS LORÁND UNIVERSITY   (Hungary)

Author keywords

Auctions; D44; D81; Insurance; Risk aversion

Indexed keywords

EID: 0041597008     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0165-1765(99)00115-9     Document Type: Article

References (8)

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