Budget feasible mechanism design: From prior-free to Bayesian

Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 449-458

  Bei, Xiaohui ^a   Chen, Ning ^b   Gravin, Nick ^b   Lu, Pinyan ^c  

^a TSINGHUA UNIVERSITY   (China)

^b NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY   (Singapore)

^c MICROSOFT RESEARCH ASIA   (China)

Author keywords

approximation; bayesian; budget feasible; mechanism design; prior free; subadditive; submodular

Indexed keywords

APPROXIMATION; BAYESIAN; BUDGET FEASIBLE; MECHANISM DESIGN; PRIOR-FREE; SUBADDITIVE; SUBMODULAR;

COMPUTATION THEORY; GAME THEORY; MACHINE DESIGN; POLYNOMIAL APPROXIMATION;

BUDGET CONTROL;

EID: 84862613462     PISSN: 07378017     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/2213977.2214020     Document Type: Conference Paper

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