If Cooperation Is Likely Punish Mildly: Insights from Economic Experiments Based on the Snowdrift Game

PLoS ONE

Volumn 8, Issue 5, 2013, Pages

  Jiang, Luo Luo ^a   Perc, Matjaž ^b   Szolnoki, Attila ^c  

^a WENZHOU UNIVERSITY   (China)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MARIBOR   (Slovenia)

^c INSTITUTE OF EXPERIMENTAL MEDICINE   (Hungary)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ADULT; ARTICLE; CONTROLLED STUDY; COOPERATION; COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS; DECISION MAKING; ECONOMIC ASPECT; FEMALE; GAME; HUMAN; HUMAN EXPERIMENT; MALE; MOTIVATION; NORMAL HUMAN; PSYCHOLOGICAL WELL BEING; PUNISHMENT; SOCIAL ADAPTATION; SOCIAL INTERACTION;

COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; ECONOMICS, BEHAVIORAL; FEMALE; GAME THEORY; HUMANS; INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS; LIKELIHOOD FUNCTIONS; MALE; MODELS, PSYCHOLOGICAL; MOTIVATION; PUNISHMENT; STUDENTS; YOUNG ADULT;

EID: 84878593177     PISSN: None     EISSN: 19326203     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0064677     Document Type: Article

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