Replicator dynamics of reward & reputation in public goods games

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 267, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 22-28

  Hauert, Christoph ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

Author keywords

Cooperation; Evolutionary game theory; Reputation; Reward; Social dilemma

Indexed keywords

COMPLEXITY; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; EVOLUTIONARY THEORY; GAME THEORY; PRISONER DILEMMA; PUBLIC GOODS;

ARTICLE; CONTROLLED STUDY; COOPERATION; GAME; GROUP DYNAMICS; MATHEMATICAL MODEL; MOTIVATION; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PUNISHMENT; REINFORCEMENT; REPUTATION; REWARD; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR; SOCIAL INTERACTION;

COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; GAME THEORY; GROUP PROCESSES; HUMANS; PUNISHMENT; REWARD; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR;

EID: 77955683668     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: 10958541     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.08.009     Document Type: Article

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