Sustainable institutionalized punishment requires elimination of second-order free-riders

Scientific Reports

Volumn 2, Issue , 2012, Pages

  Perc, Matjaž ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MARIBOR   (Slovenia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84859761970     PISSN: None     EISSN: 20452322     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1038/srep00344     Document Type: Article

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