The Evolution of Coercive Institutional Punishment

Dynamic Games and Applications

Volumn 2, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 97-109

  Isakov, Alexander ^a   Rand, David G ^b  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Coercion; Cooperation; Evolutionary game theory; Institutional punishment

Indexed keywords

EID: 84867541493     PISSN: 21530785     EISSN: 21530793     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s13235-011-0020-9     Document Type: Article

References (40)

1. Abbink K, Herrmann B (2009) The moral costs of nastiness. Discussion Paper, Cent Decis Res Exp Econ, University of Nottingham.
2. Boyd R, Richerson PJ (1992) Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups. Ethol Sociobiol 13: 171-195.
3. Boyd R, Gintis H, Bowles S, Richerson PJ (2003) The evolution of altruistic punishment. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 100: 3531-3535.
4. Burnham T, Johnson DDP (2005) The evolutionary and biological logic of human cooperation. Anal Krit 27: 113-135.
5. Clutton-Brock TH, Parker GA (1995) Punishment in animal societies. Nature 373: 209-216.
6. Dawes CT, Fowler JH, Johnson T, McElreath R, Smirnov O (2007) Nat Lett 446: 794-796.
7. Dreber A, Rand DG, Fudenberg D, Nowak MA (2008) Winers don't punish. Nat Lett 452: 348-351.
8. Fehr E, Gachter S (2002) Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature 415: 137-140.
9. Gurerk O, Irlenbusch B, Rockenbach B (2006) The competitive advantage of sanctioning institutions. Science 312: 108-111.
10. Hauert C, Traulsen A, Brandt H, Nowak MA, Sigmund K (2007) Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment. Science 316: 1905-1907.
11. Helbing D, Szolnoki A, Perc M, Szabo G (2010) Evolutionary establishment of moral and double moral standards through spatial interactions. PLoS Comput Biol. doi: 10. 1371/journal. pcbi. 1000758.
12. Henrich J, Boyd R (2001) Why people punish defectors: weak conformist transmission can stabilize costly enforcement of norms in cooperative dilemmas. J Theor Biol 208: 79-89.
13. Herrmann B, Thoni C, Gachter S (2008) Antisocial punishment across societies. Science 319: 1362-1367.
14. Janssen MA, Bushman C (2008) Evolution of cooperation and altruistic punishment when retaliation is possible. J Theor Biol. doi: 10. 1016/j. jtbi. 2008. 06. 017.
15. Keller L (1999) Levels of selection in evolution. Princeton Univ Press, Princeton.
16. Michod RE (1999) Darwinian dynamics. Princeton Univ Press, Princeton.
17. Nakamaru M, Iwasa Y (2005) The evolution of altruism by costly punishment in lattice-structured populations: score-dependent viability versus score-dependent fertility. Evol Ecol Res 7: 853-870.
18. Nakamaru M, Iwasa Y (2006) The coevolution of altruism and punishment: role of the selfish punisher. J Theor Biol 2450: 475-488.
19. O'Gorman R, Henrich J, van Vugt M (2009) Constraining free riding in public goods games: designated solitary punishers can sustain human cooperation. Proc R Soc B 276: 323-329.
20. Ostrom E, Walker J, Gardner R (1992) Covenants with and without a sword: self-governance is possible. Am Polit Sci Rev 86: 404-417.
21. Panchanathan K, Boyd R (2004) Indirect reciprocity can stabilize cooperation without the second-order free rider problem. Nature 432: 499-502.
22. Paulsson J (2002) Multileveled selection on plasmid replication. J Genet 161: 1373-1384.
23. Rainey PB, Rainey K (2003) Evolution of cooperation and conflict in experimental bacterial populations. Nature 425: 72-74.
24. Rand DG (2011) The promise of Mechanical Turk: How online labor markets can help theorists run behavioral experiments. J Theor Biol. doi: 10. 1016/j. jtbi. 2011. 03. 004.
25. Rand DG, Dreber A, Ellingsen T, Fudenberg D, Nowak MA (2009) Positive interactions promote public cooperation. Science 325: 1272-1275.
26. Rand DG, Ohtsuki H, Nowak MA (2009) Direct reciprocity with costly punishment: generous tit-for-tat prevails. J Theor Biol 256: 45-47.
27. Rand DG, Armao JJ, Nakamaru M, Ohtsuki H (2010) Anti-social punishment can prevent the co-evolution of punishment and cooperation. J Theor Biol 265: 624-632.
28. Rockenbach B, Milinski M (2006) The efficient interaction of indirect reciprocity and costly punishment. Nature 444: 718-723.
29. Rogers AR (1990) Group selection by selective emigration: the effects of migration and kin structure. Am Nat 135: 398-413.
30. Sigmund K (2007) Punish or perish? Retaliation and collaboration among humans. Trends Ecol Evol 22: 593-600.
31. Sigmund K, De Silva H, Traulsen A, Christoph H (2010) Social learning promotes institutions for governing the commons. Nature 466: 861-863.
32. Sutter M, Haigner S, Kocher MG (2010) Choosing the carrot or the stick? Endogenous institutional choice in social dilemma situations. Rev Econ Stud 77: 1540-1566.
33. Taylor PD, Wilson DS (1988) A mathematical model for altruism in haystacks. Evolution 42: 193-197.
34. Traulsen A, Pacheco JM, Nowak MA (2007) Pairwise comparison and selection temperature in evolutionary game dynamics. J Theor Biol 246: 522-529.
35. Traulsen A, Hauert C, de Silva H, Nowak MA, Sigmund K (2009) Exploration dynamics in evolutionary games. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 106: 709-712.
36. Wang J, Wu B, Ho DWC, Wang L (2011) Evolution of cooperation in multilevel public goods games with community structures. Europhys Lett 93: 58001.
37. Williams GC, Williams DC (1957) Natural selection of individually harmful social adaptations among sibs with special reference social insects. Evolution 11: 32-39.
38. Wilson EO, Holldobler B (2005) Eusociality: origin and consequences. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 102: 7411-7414.
39. Wilson DS, Sober E (1994) Reintroducing group selection to the human behavioral sciences. Behav Brain Sci 17: 585-608.
40. Yamagishi T (1986) The provision of a sanctioning system as a public good. J Pers Soc Psychol 51: 110-116.