CEO contract design: How do strong principals do it?

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 108, Issue 3, 2013, Pages 659-674

  Cronqvist, Henrik ^a   Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger ^b  

^a CLAREMONT MCKENNA COLLEGE   (United States)

^b EPFL   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Contracting theory; Employment contracts; Executive compensation; LBOs

Indexed keywords

EID: 84877621371     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.01.013     Document Type: Article

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