CEO compensation in venture-backed firms

Journal of Business Venturing

Volumn 26, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 391-411

  Bengtsson, Ola ^a   Hand, John R M ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA   (United States)

Author keywords

CEO compensation; Private venture backed companies; Rewards for successful fundraising

Indexed keywords

EID: 79955590389     PISSN: 08839026     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jbusvent.2009.11.001     Document Type: Article

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