Strong equilibria in games with the lexicographical improvement property

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 42, Issue 2, 2013, Pages 461-482

  Harks, Tobias ^a   Klimm, Max ^b   Möhring, Rolf H ^b  

^a MAASTRICHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^b TECHNISCHE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Bottleneck congestion games; Pareto efficiency; Pure Nash equilibrium; Strong equilibrium

Indexed keywords

EID: 84876423666     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-012-0322-1     Document Type: Article

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