Routing (Un-) splittable flow in games with player-specific linear latency functions

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 4051 LNCS, Issue , 2006, Pages 501-512

  Gairing, Martin ^a   Monien, Burkhard ^a   Tiemann, Karsten ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PADERBORN   (Germany)

^b International Graduate School of Dynamic Intelligent Systems ^*  (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CONVERGENCE OF NUMERICAL METHODS; FUNCTIONS; LINEAR PROGRAMMING; PARALLEL ALGORITHMS; ROUTERS; TELECOMMUNICATION TRAFFIC;

LINEAR LATENCY FUNCTIONS; NASH EQUILIBRIA; PARALLEL LINKS; ROUTING GAMES;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 33746359688     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/11786986_44     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (27)

1. S. Aland, D. Dumrauf, M. Gairing, B. Monien, and F. Schoppmann, Exact Price of Anarchy for Polynomial Congestion Games. In Proc. of the 23rd International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science, LNCS Vol. 3884, Springer Verlag, pages 218-229, 2006.
2. B. Awerbuch, Y. Azar, and A. Epstein. The Price of Routing Unsplittable Flow. In Proc. of the 37th ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pages 57-66, 2005.
3. B. Awerbuch, Y. Azar, Y. Richter, and D. Tsur. Tradeoffs in Worst-Case Equilibria. In Proc. of the 1st International Workshop on Approximation and Online Algorithms, LNCS Vol. 2909, Springer Verlag, pages 41-52, 2003.
4. M. Beckmann, C. B. McGuire, and C. B. Winsten. Studies in the Economics of Transportation. Yale University Press, 1956.
5. S. Boyd and L. Vandenberghe. Convex Optimization. Cambridge University Press, 2004.
6. S. Catoni and S. Pallottino. Traffic Equilibrium Paradoxes. Transportation Science, 25(3):240-244, 1991.
7. G. Christodoulou and E. Koutsoupias. The Price of Anarchy of Finite Congestion Games. In Proc. of the 37th ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pages 67-73, 2005.
8. R. Cominetti, J. R. Correa, and N. E. Stier-Moses. Network Games With Atomic Players. In Proc. of the 33rd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming, to appear 2006.
9. A. Czumaj and B. Vöcking. Tight Bounds for Worst-Case Equilibria. In Proc. of the 13th ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, pages 413-420, 2002.
10. Also accepted to Journal of Algorithms as Special Issue of SODA'02.
11. D. Fotakis, S. Kontogiannis, and P. Spirakis. Selfish Unsplittable Flows. In Proc. of the 31st International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming, LNCS Vol. 3142, Springer Verlag, pages 593-605, 2004.
12. M. Gairing, T. Lücking, M. Mavronicolas, and B. Monien. Computing Nash Equilibria for Scheduling on Restricted Parallel Links. In Proc. of the 36th ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pages 613-622, 2004.
13. M. Gairing, T. Lucking, B. Monien, and K. Tiemann. Nash Equilibria, the Price of Anarchy and the Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture. In Proc. of the 32nd International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming, LNCS Vol. 3580, Springer Verlag, pages 51-65, 2005.
14. M. Gairing, B. Monien, and K. Tiemann. Selfish Routing with Incomplete Information. In Proc. of the 17th ACM Symposium on Parallel Algorithms and Architectures, pages 203-212, 2005.
15. C. Georgiou, T. Pavlides, and A. Philippou. Network Uncertainty in Selfish Routing. In Proc. of the 20th IEEE International Parallel & Distributed Processing Symposium, 2006.
16. J. C. Harsanyi. Games with Incomplete Information Played by Bayesian Players, I, II, III. Management Science, 14:159-182, 320-332, 468-502, 1967.
17. L. G. Khachiyan. A Polynomial Time Algorithm in Linear Programming. Soviet Mathematics Doklady, 20(1):191-194, 1979.
18. E. Koutsoupias and C. H. Papadimitriou. Worst-Case Equilibria. In Proc. of the 16th International Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science, LNCS Vol. 1563, Springer Verlag, pages 404-413, 1999.
19. L. Libman and A. Orda. Atomic Resource Sharing in Noncooperative Networks. Telecommunication Systems, 17(4):385-409, 2001.
20. I. Milchtaich. Congestion Games with Player-Specific Payoff Functions. Games and Economic Behavior, 13(1):111-124, 1996.
21. D. Monderer. Multipotential Games. Unpublished manuscript, available at http://ie.technion.ac.il/dov/multipotential.games.pdf, 2005.
22. J. F. Nash. Non-Cooperative Games. Annals of Mathematics, 54(2):286-295, 1951.
23. A. Orda, R. Rom, and N. Shimkin. Competitive Routing in Multiuser Communication Networks. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, 1(5):510-521, 1993.
24. R. W. Rosenthal. A Class of Games Possessing Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria. International Journal of Game Theory, 2:65-67, 1973.
25. T. Roughgarden. Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy. MIT Press, 2005.
26. T. Roughgarden and E. Tardos. How Bad Is Selfish Routing? Journal of the ACM, 49(2):236-259, 2002.
27. J. G. Wardrop. Some Theoretical Aspects of Road Traffic Research. In Proc. of the Institute of Civil Engineers, Pt. II, Vol. I, pages 325-378, 1952.