Wardrop equilibria and price of stability for bottleneck games with splittable traffic

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 4286 LNCS, Issue , 2006, Pages 331-342

  Mazalov, Vladimir ^a   Monien, Burkhard ^b   Schoppmann, Florian ^b   Tiemann, Karsten ^b  

^a INSTITUTE OF APPLIED MATHEMATICAL RESEARCH   (Russian Federation)

^b UNIVERSITY OF PADERBORN   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMMUNICATION NETWORKS; GENERAL GRAPH; INDEPENDENCE RESULT; LATENCY FUNCTION; MAXIMIZE THROUGHPUT; MAXIMUM LATENCY; NETWORK TOPOLOGY; NONCOOPERATIVE NETWORKS; PARALLEL LINKS; PRICE OF STABILITY; SERIES-PARALLEL; SERIES-PARALLEL GRAPH; SINK NODES; SOCIAL COST; SOURCE NODES; SUBGRAPHS; TRAFFIC DISTRIBUTIONS; WARDROP; WARDROP EQUILIBRIUM; WEIGHTED SUM;

ELECTRIC NETWORK TOPOLOGY; INTERNET; SYSTEM STABILITY; WINE;

COSTS;

EID: 70449495998     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/11944874_30     Document Type: Conference Paper

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