Strong and correlated strong equilibria in monotone congestion games

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 4286 LNCS, Issue , 2006, Pages 74-86

  Rozenfeld, Ola ^a   Tennenholtz, Moshe ^a  

^a TECHNION ISRAEL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (Israel)

Author keywords

Congestion games; Strong equilibrium

Indexed keywords

CONGESTION GAMES; STRONG EQUILIBRIUM;

INTERNET; WINE;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 77049122319     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/11944874_8     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (9)

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