Pure strategy nash equilibrium in a group formation game with positive externalities

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 21, Issue 1-2, 1997, Pages 161-182

  Konishi, Hideo ^a   Le Breton, Michel ^b   Weber, Shlomo ^a  

^a SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031256777     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1997.0542     Document Type: Article

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