On the inefficiency of equilibria in linear bottleneck congestion games

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 6386 LNCS, Issue M4D, 2010, Pages 335-346

  De Keijzer, Bart ^a   Schäfer, Guido ^a   Telelis, Orestis A ^a  

^a CWI   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BOTTLENECK CONGESTION; GAMES MODEL; LATENCY FUNCTION; LOAD-BALANCING; LOWER BOUNDS; MAXIMUM LATENCY; NATURAL LOADS; PRICE OF ANARCHY; RELATED MACHINES; SOCIAL COST;

PARALLEL ARCHITECTURES; TRAFFIC CONGESTION;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 78649597647     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-16170-4_29     Document Type: Conference Paper

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