Strong price of anarchy

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 65, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 289-317

  Andelman, Nir ^a   Feldman, Michal ^b   Mansour, Yishay ^a  

^a TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^b HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

Coalitions; Congestion games; Job scheduling; Network formation; Price of anarchy; Strong equilibrium; Strong price of anarchy

Indexed keywords

EID: 59249097473     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.03.005     Document Type: Article

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