Strong and pareto price of anarchy in congestion games

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 5555 LNCS, Issue PART 1, 2009, Pages 279-291

  Chien, Steve ^a   Sinclair, Alistair ^b  

^a MICROSOFT RESEARCH   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ASYMMETRIC GAMES; CONGESTION GAMES; LATENCY FUNCTION; NASH EQUILIBRIA; NASH EQUILIBRIUM; PARETO-OPTIMAL; PRICE OF ANARCHY; SYMMETRIC GAMES;

LINGUISTICS; PARETO PRINCIPLE; STANDARDS; TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS; TRANSLATION (LANGUAGES);

COSTS;

EID: 70449125879     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-02927-1_24     Document Type: Conference Paper

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