Strong price of anarchy for machine load balancing

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 4596 LNCS, Issue , 2007, Pages 583-594

  Fiat, Amos ^a   Kaplan, Haim ^a   Levy, Meital ^a   Olonetsky, Svetlana ^a  

^a TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

Author keywords

Game theory; Load balancing; Price of anarchy; Strong nash equilibria

Indexed keywords

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; COMPUTER SCIENCE; GAME THEORY;

K-STRONG EQUILIBRIA; PRICE OF ANARCHY; STRONG NASH EQUILIBRIA;

RESOURCE ALLOCATION;

EID: 38149091791     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-73420-8_51     Document Type: Conference Paper

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