Strong nash equilibria in games with the lexicographical improvement property

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 5929 LNCS, Issue , 2009, Pages 463-470

  Harks, Tobias ^a   Klimm, Max ^a   Möhring, Rolf H ^a  

^a TECHNISCHE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

AXIOMATIC FRAMEWORK; CONGESTION GAMES; GENERAL CLASS; MALLEABLE JOBS; NASH EQUILIBRIA; NEW RESULTS;

INTERNET; TRAFFIC CONGESTION;

WINE;

EID: 76649132730     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-10841-9_43     Document Type: Conference Paper

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