Learning in Networks

Handbook of Social Economics

Volumn 1, Issue 1 B, 2011, Pages 679-727

  Goyal, Sanjeev ^a  

^a CHRIST S COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Bandit arms; Networks; Social learning

Indexed keywords

EID: 84872391428     PISSN: 15706435     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/B978-0-444-53187-2.00015-2     Document Type: Chapter

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