Contagion and efficiency

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 143, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 251-274

  Alós Ferrer, Carlos ^a   Weidenholzer, Simon ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KONSTANZ   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

Author keywords

Imitation; Learning; Local interaction games

Indexed keywords

EID: 55549132253     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2007.12.003     Document Type: Article

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