The economics of rights, co-operation and welfare

The Economics of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare

Volumn , Issue , 2004, Pages 1-243

  Sugden, Robert ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EAST ANGLIA   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85014646626     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1057/9780230536791     Document Type: Book

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