A note on control costs and logit rules for strategic games

Journal of Evolutionary Economics

Volumn 12, Issue 5, 2002, Pages 563-575

  Baron, Richard ^a   Durieu, Jacques ^a   Haller, Hans ^b   Solal, Philippe ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ JEAN MONNET   (France)

^b VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE AND STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Evolutionary games; Stochastic best response dynamics

Indexed keywords

EID: 0142202024     PISSN: 09369937     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00191-002-0135-7     Document Type: Article

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