Learning in networks

Group Formation in Economics: Networks, Clubs, and Coalitions

Volumn , Issue , 2005, Pages 122-168

  Goyal, Sanjeev ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ESSEX   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84929727543     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511614385.005     Document Type: Chapter

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