Learning correlated equilibria in population games

Mathematical social sciences

Volumn 42, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 271-294

  Ianni, Antonella ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

C72; C73; Correlated equilibria; Games with identical interests; Learning dynamics; Population games

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042367343     PISSN: 01654896     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4896(01)00073-7     Document Type: Article

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