Evolution in games with endogenous mistake probabilities

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 106, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 296-315

  van Damme, Eric ^a   Weibull, Jörgen W ^b  

^a TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^b Boston University   (United States)

Author keywords

Evolution; Mistakes; Mutation rates

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036815894     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2941     Document Type: Article

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